

A Case Study on Setting Up Pipeline Integrity Management System for a Medium Enterprise Operator

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Process & Pipeline Services BHGE

21 November, 2018


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BHGE's role in the Integrity Management Process

PIMS Management systems...


- PIMS Manuals
- PVi7 Software implementation
- Data commissioning





Pipeline Operators

PIMS Implementation Scenarios





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Case Study: Medium Pipeline Network + Low PIMS Budget

Reasons for change Before

- Operator lacked process and tools for PIMS and maintained a prescriptive integrity management approach with people for data management, inspection strategy and performance monitoring.
- There were no formal pipeline integrity management procedures in place, with no tools available to execute engineering assessments (i.e. risk assessment) for pipelines.


After

- Successful development and deployment of PIMS
- Knowledge transfer
- Risk assessment and Integrity Management Plan
- Shift in culture



PIMS Definition*


- A framework that translates company and industry best practices into specific business processes
- Built around the plan-do-review cycle
- Achieved through full integration and alignment of all individual company management systems



*Management System Approach to Pipeline Integrity. I.Colquhoun (GE), C. Calvi (COPI), H. MacPherson (GE). IPC 2006-10531




Typical PIMS Framework




Building Integrity Management Infrastructure

PIMS Management System comprises...


... the *process*, workflows & integrity targets to drive Pipeline Integrity Management, via the right <u>people</u> in the right org structure using the right tools software & database <u>tools</u>



















PIMS Development & Implementation



End Objective – Best in Class




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PIMS Development and Implementation

- 1. PIMS Gap Analysis
- Preparation of PIMS Manual and Procedures Including: 2.
 - Inspection and Monitoring Procedure
 - **Anomaly Management Procedure**
 - **Prevention and Mitigation Procedure**
- 3. PIMS Implementation

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- Risk Assessment
 - Data Collection
 - Risk Workshop
 - Identification of threats based on risk assessment
- Integrity Management Planning Ο
- Performance Monitoring and Reporting



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PIMS Implementation

Gap Analysis



- Review existing practices
- Capture best practices
- Identify operational constraints
- Recommend action plan to close gaps

PIMS Manual and Procedures

- PIMS Procedures
 - -Threat Identification, RA & IMP
 - -Inspection & Monitoring
 - -Anomaly Management
 - -Prevention & Mitigation



Small Pipeline Network + Low PIMS Budget PIMS Implementation

Data Collection

- Documents/Data gap analysis
- Data gaps filled by:
 - Engineering judgments discussed and agreed
 - Post workshop data collection
- Input data for risk assessment provided as part of deliverables in an organized manner

Risk Modelling Workshop

- Familiarize Operator with BHGE Risk Model
- Identify and review the threats to the pipelines
- Discuss and review the available data and address data gaps.
- Discuss and agree pipeline segmentation criteria and RAM for presentation of risk results.



Small Pipeline Network + Low PIMS Budget PIMS Implementation

Risk Assessment

- A comprehensive semi-quantitative risk assessment was performed.
- These risk results were presented in the form of a risk matrix as per operator's RAM and definitions to identify the Risk category (High, Medium or Low).

Integrity Management Plan

- Mitigation measures for the dominant threats that drive risk were identified and used to re-calculate risk.
- Post mitigation risk results were presented in the operator's risk matrix to show the residual risk following mitigation actions.

Performance & Monitoring Reporting Guideline

- Evaluation of the on-going effectiveness and suitability of the PIMS by monitoring results and trends for KPI's
- Proactively implement improvements.









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Pipeline Integrity Management Process





Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)





Quantitative Risk model...

... the risk model that forms the core is integrity management functionality is *quantitative*... it provides the benefits of quantitative risk using the same lower data intensity of semi-quantitative models

Risk drivers

- Keep people & environment safe
- Increase asset availability
- Maintain reputation




Key question

- Where & what risks to focus?
- What's my safety \$ exposure & environment?
- Will my spend reduce risk to ar acceptable level?

Quantitative? **PVi7 risk model**

- Most models are semiquantitative
- Quantitative models costly & data intensive



 Output has absolute meaning & tangibility

- Compare risk across pipelines, systems & threats
- Map H&S, finance & environment to common scale

... Semi-Quantitative: models can answer the questions of where do I spend and how

... Quantitative:

models are needed to answer how much should I spend, am I spending too much? Am I spending enough

... PVi7 is quantitative:

the model provides the benefits of quantitative risk without needing the data intensity and cost of typical quantitative models




Risk assessment and integrity management planning


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Quantitative Risk Assessment









Solution for Medium Pipeline Network + Low PIMS Budget

H&S Flammable area Sum

H&S Toxic area

94 3 3 96 95 3 3 99

Risk Service


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End Pipeline Distance (m)	All	1048	2784	3205	7048
WallThickness (mm)	Multiple	21	21	21	21
OutsideDiameter (mm)	Multiple	558.8	558.8	558.8	558.8
Pressure (bar)	Multiple	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
SMYS (MPa)	Multiple	450	450	450	450

Data loading templates

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
input table



Macro to copy input table values into probability and consequence calculation sheets

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Pipe di	amete	r	8	8	17	4
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Maximu	im ope	erating temperature	136	8	20	4
Specifi	ed min	imum yield strength	10	8	21	4
Estimat	ed cor	rosion rate	65	8	22	4
HasMic	robial		101	8	23	4
HasAC	Induce	d	95	8	24	4
Haspre	viousE	CFailure	102	8	25	4
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Maps, referencing input table fields to attributes used in calculation



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6.06E-06

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Attribute	Row	Column	Report Ro	Report Co	re	Failure probab	ility for externa	I corrosion (leak)				
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Environmental Toxic area	91		3	25								
Financial Hazard area	92		3	90								
H&S Flammable area Max	93			93								




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Probability, Consequence and Risk reports

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
Risk Workshop





Risk Results Before (a) and after Mitigation (b)

- The threat that was found dominant was Weather and Outside Force in both offshore risers.
- The next threat in the pipeline was failure due to Incorrect Operations in start safety zone, main line and end safety zone.
- Mechanical Damage threat in the pipeline was driven by anchor handling.
- Internal Corrosion threat in the pipeline was demonstrated to be low.



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Small Pipeline Network + Low PIMS Budget Conclusion

Pipeline integrity management system was implemented successfully with safety, quality and efficiency within the available resources.

Advantages over Typical PIMS supported by Database and Enterprise Software

- Low cost and staffing levels
- Risk assessment workshop instead of detailed software
- Stepwise approach to PIMS development made it easier for operator to adopt
- The decision to implement the developed PIMS with the support of consultant through a senior integrity engineer absorbed the initial surge of workload and roadblocks.



